Magyar Keresztény Mennonita Egyház and Jeremias Izsak-Bacs v. Hungary and 8 other applications (no. 79045/11) – Communicated 27 September 2012. The applicants are religious communities and individuals living or operating in Hungary. On 30 December 2011 the Hungarian Parliament enacted Act no. Act CCVI of 2011 on the Right to Freedom of Conscience and Religion and the Legal Status of Churches, Denominations and Religious Communities. It entered into force on 1 January 2012.
Apart from the recognized churches listed in the Appendix of the Act, all other religious communities, previously registered as churches, lost their status as churches and could continue their activities as associations. If intending to continue as churches, religious communities are required to apply to Parliament for individual recognition as such.
The applicants did not obtain re-registration and consequently lost their status as churches, together with the state subsidies that had been due to them as such.
The applicants complain under Article 11 – read in the light of Article 9 and, moreover, read alone and in conjunction with Article 14 – that the discretionary re-registration of churches amounts to a violation of their right to freedom of religion and is discriminatory. Under Articles 6 and 13, they complain that the relevant procedure is unfair and does not offer any effective remedy.
Furthermore, a number of the applicants complain under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, read alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, about the loss of state subsidies due to the loss of church status.
Cassar v. Malta (no. 36982/11) – Communicated 27 March 2012. The applicant is a Maltese national who was born male in 1981 and underwent gender reassignment surgery in 2005. On 20 June 2006 the First Hall of the Civil Court ordered that annotations be made in the applicant’s birth certificate that the details regarding sex be changed from male to female and that the applicant’s name was to be changed from Joseph to Joanne.
Shortly thereafter the applicant requested the Director of Public Registry to issue marriage banns for her and her boyfriend, T. The request was refused. In subsequent litigation the refusal was upheld, as the Civil Court found that that a marriage between the applicant and a person of the male sex would be contrary to the provisions of the Marriage Act and that the annotation made on the applicant’s birth certificate following the relevant court judgment was only intended to protect the applicant’s privacy and did not give her any right to consider herself female for the purposes of marriage.
The applicant instituted proceeedings for constitutional redress. She complained that the fact that Maltese law did not recognise transsexuals as persons of the acquired sex for all intents and purposes, including that of contracting marriage, breached her rights under Articles 8 and 12 of the Convention. Moreover, she complained that the fact that a transsexual could not marry either a male or a female constituted inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3 of the Convention. She requested redress in the form of a remedy, in particular a declaration that the Director of Public Registry could not refuse to issue her marriage banns just because she had undergone gender reassignment surgery, and compensation. The Civil Court found a violation of Articles 8 and 12 and declared that the Director of Public Registry could not refuse to issue the applicant’s marriage banns just because she had undergone gender reassignment surgery. Considering these declarations to be a sufficient remedy, it refused to award compensation. The court rejected her claim under Article 3 of the Convention.
On appeal, the Constitutional Court confirmed the breach of Articles 8 and 12 on different reasoning, overturning the judgment that the the Director of Public Registry could not refuse to issue the marriage banns. The applicant’s rights had been breached not in her inability to marry but by the lack of legislation providing for a life partnership and the State’s consequent failure to fulfill its positive obligation under Article 8, which also violated Article 12. The Constitutional Court considered that the remedy provided by the first-instance court (namely the declaration that the Registrar could not refuse to issue the banns under the Marriage Act) would therefore not be an appropriate remedy in the circumstances of the case. In any event, the applicant had recently broken off her engagement – therefore the banns could not be issued.
Before the ECtHR the applicant complained under Articles 8, 12 and 13 of the Convention that she was not granted an effective remedy in respect of the breach of her rights and therefore that she is still a victim of a violation of Articles 8 and 12 of the Convention. The question before the Court is, Has there been a violation of the applicant’s right to marry contrary to Article 12 of the Convention?
S.A.S. v. France (no. 43835/11) – Communicated 1 February 2012. The applicant is a French national, a practicing Muslim, who declares that she wears the burqa in order to comply with her faith, her culture, and her personal convictions. For her it is a matter of covering her entire body, including a fine veil covering her face as well the niqab, a veil covering the face with the exception of the eyes. She emphasizes that neither her husband nor any other member of her family puts any pressure upon her to dress in this fashion.
The applicant wears the niqab in private as well as in public, but in a systematic way. For example, she does not wear it when consulting a doctor, or when she meets friends in a public place, or seeks to make acquaintances. She therefore agrees not to wear the niqab in public all the time, but she wishes to be able to make the choice, under certain appropriate spiritual conditions, as, for example, for religious events during Ramadan. Her goal is not to create a nuisance for others, but to be able to be in accord with her own religious feelings and beliefs.
The applicant agrees that she should remove the face covering for security checks, at a bank, or when taking a plane. However, under French law she is forbidden to cover her face in public at all.
The applicant therefore complains that when she wears the veil in public she could be subject, under law, to penalties as well as to harassment and discrimination, constituting degrading treatment in violation of ECHR Article 3. She furthermore invokes Article 8 of the Convention, violation of her right to respect for her private life. Invoking Articles 9, 10, and 11 she complains of violation of freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and freedom of association or assembly. Finally, invoking Article 14, she complains that the legal prohibition of wearing a face covering in public generates discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, and ethnic origin, to the detriment of women, such as herself, who wear the total veil.
Stoyanov v. Bulgaria (no. 19557/05) – Communicated 11 July 2011. The applicant, a Bulgarian national, is a writer, a poet and journalist. At the time of the facts of the case he was working as a regional correspondent for the national daily newspaper “Novinar.” In 1999 he published books describing in a controversial manner life among the Pomaks, a Bulgarian-speaking Muslim group centered in the area of the applicant’s residents. The publications, which included description of sexual activity, prompted outrage that was followed by criminal charges against the applicant for production, distribution and sale of pornographic books. Though the charges were eventually dismissed, the applicant alleges damage from the publicity surrounding the matter.
Before the ECtHR the applicant complains of violations of Article 8 (respect for private and family life), Article 10 (the accusations made it impossible for him to distribute his work in the region), and Articles 6 and 13 (legal procedures).
Avilkina and Others v. Russia (no. 1585/09) – Communicated 23 May 2011. Applicants, three Russian nationals and the Administrative Centre of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia, complain, among other things, that the St Petersburg City Prosecutor wrongfully interfered, in the case of the three Russian nationals, with the applicants’ rights to respect for their private life, when the prosecutor’s office forced doctors to disclose information contained in the applicants’ medical files. These allegations stem from prosecutorial requests concerning and interference in the medical care of the applicants, viewed at times as unconventional or problematic, but based on applicants’ religious beliefs (e.g., in concerns about possible refusal of blood transfusions). This in turn drew the applicant organisation into the controversy as prosecutorial investigations continued, with alleged irregularities, into the organization’s teachings and activities, despite lower court findings that none of the applicants was currently engaged in unlawful activities.
The applicant organisation thus complains, among other things, under Articles 9 and 11 of the Convention that the public authorities have conducted investigations into its activities in an abusive and excessive manner, as well as focusing their investigations on the legitimacy of Jehovah’s Witness beliefs and the means by which church members express them. The Administrative Centre also complains under Articles 9 and 14 that other religions have not had to submit to comparable abusive, extensive and intrusive investigations.
Bremner v. Turkey (no. 37428/06) – Communicated 16 May 2011. This case involves an Australian national who was a correspondent for an Australian newspaper in Turkey. He also worked as a volunteer for a bookstore specializing in books about Christianity. Some time before June 1997 he was contacted by a Turkish man (A.N.) seeking information about Christianity. In a second meeting with A.N. and some others interested in Christianity, Mr. Bremner presented teachings of the Bible and told the audience how a baptism takes place, unaware that he was being filmed with a hidden camera for a program intended for broadcast on national television. Police arrived, and Mr. Bremner was arrested and charged with blasphemy; he was acquitted on April 28, 1998.
On June 24, 1997, the footage of Mr. Bremner’s presentation was shown on national television as part of a report on “covert activities carried out in Turkey by ‘merchants of foreign religions.'” Mr. Bremner brought action in the Turkish courts for damages, citing defamation and violation of privacy and right to freedom of expression. According to the judgment of the highest Turkish court, the images in question did not concern details of the applicant’s private life but were part of a question of current public interest and that the authors had attempted to maintain a suitable balance between form and substance.
Seeking redress before the ECtHR, the applicant invokes Articles 6, 8, 9, and 10 of the Convention.
Ladele and McFarlane v. United Kingdom (nos. 51671/10 and 36516/10) – Communicated 2 May 2011. The applicants are British nationals, Christians, who consider that same-sex marriage (Ms Ladele) and homosexual activity (Mr McFarlane) are contrary to God’s law or sinful. As a Registrar, Ms Ladele refused to conduct same-sex civil marriage ceremonies or to register such ceremonies. She was informed that she was required to perform such services, on pain of termination. As a counsellor, Mr McFarlane refused to give an unequivocal commitment to counsel same-sex couples, and he was dismissed from his employment. The applicants complain that domestic law failed adequately to protect their right to manifest their religion, contrary to Article 9 of the Convention, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14. The first applicant further complains of lack of effective remedy (Article 13), while the second applicant complains of lack of a fair trial (Article 6) and violation of right to respect for private life (Article 8).
Eweida and Chaplin v. United Kingdom (nos. 48420/10 and 59842/10) – Communicated 2 May 2011. The applicants are British nationals, Christians who complained of employment discrimination arising from their desires to manifest their religious beliefs by wearing visible symbols of their beliefs, a silver cross (Ms Eweida) and a crucifix (Ms Chaplin) in the workplace. The applicants assert that domestic law failed adequately to protect their right to manifest their religion, contrary to Article 9 of the Convention, taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14.
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United Kingdom (no. 7552/09) – Communicated 26 April 2011. The applicant religious organization, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, complains under ECHR Article 9, alone and in conjunction with Article 14, of discrimination in regards to loss of statutory tax exemption for one of its places of worship, the Preston Temple in Lancashire, Northern England. The exemption was withdrawn because the Temple is open for worship only by worthy members of the Church and not by the general public. The applicant further complains under Article 1 of Protocol 1 alone and connection with Article 14 that denial of the statutory exemption is disproportionate discimination on the grounds of religion. Finally, the applicant complains under Article 13 of failure by the House of Lords to adequately apply the Convention.
Ibragimov and Cultural Educational Fund “Nuru-Badi” v. Russia (no. 1413/08) – Communicated 4 April 2011. Mr. Ibragim Salekh ogly Ibragimov is a Russian national, the executive director of the registered NGO Cultural Educational Fund “Nuru-Badi,” which publishes a body of commentary on the Qur’an written by a Muslim Turkish scholar. In April 2006 the prosecutor of the Tartarstan Republic applied to a court asking that some of the books from the collection be declared extremist and be banned, offering expert opinions of pyschologists who found that the texts “attempted to subconsciously influence the psyche of the reader,” inducing irrational values and opinions, depriving the reader of capability to think critically and to choose freely his religion. Texts further incited readers to look at non-believers with disdain, aversion, anger, hatred, and enmity, promoting discord. Muslims guilty of apostasy from Islam “were even denied the right to life.” Alternative experts in theology said the books exposed the foundations of the Islamic doctrine and commented upon the Qur’an and did not contain extremist statements and did not call for violence or ethnic or religious enmity. The moral condemnation of sinners and non-believers in the texts, rather, is characteristic of all religious texts. In fact, said these experts, the author promoted peaceful coexistence of religious and dialogue between them. In the opinion of these experts, “the prosecutor’s experts were incompetent in religious matters and did not have even basic knowledge of Islam. The reproaches made by them … could have been made against any theological treatise.”
The applicants complain under Article 6 of unfair judicial proceedings and under Articles 9 (freedom of religion) and 10 (freedom of expression) about the ban on distributing the books, which are used for religious and educational purposes in mosques and medreses. The applicants also refer to Article 14 (discrmination). In its communication to the Russian government, the Court asks whether the inference with the applicants’ rights was prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society.
Valiullin and The Association of Mosques of Russia v. Russia (no. 30112/08) – Communicated 4 April 2011. The applicants, a Muslim teacher and lawyer, and a Muslim religious organization, complain before the Court that the banning of certain books and other publications by the Buguruslan Town Court of the Orenburg Region violates their freedom of religion and their right to receive and impart information. The applicants complain further of violations of Articles 6 and 13 in the way their case was handled by Russian authorities.
Ali v. Romania (no. 30595/09) – Communicated 4 April 2011. Muslim prisoner in Romania protests court proceedings and prison conditions, including the fact that he was forced in a prison transfer to leave behind his Koran and his prayer mat. He alleges, invoking Article 9, that his freedom of religion is infringed because there are no special places in the prison in which he resides where he can effectively observe his Muslim rituals and pray.
Al-Kamisi v. Sweden (no. 49431/10) – Communicated 28 March 2011. The applicant, Ms Wejdan Haris Dihrab Al-Kamisi, is an Iraqi national of Christian Mandean denomination (Alsabaa Almandaae). She has one son, born in 1998. In 1999 she divorced her husband, who moved to the United States, while she lived with her son in Iraq. After receiving threatening letters and phone calls from unknown persons saying she would have to get married or leave the neighborhood, the applicant travelled with her son to Jordan. She left her son with relatives there while she travelled to Sweden. Her former husband came to Jordan and took the son back to the United States. Her appeal for asylum in Sweden was based upon fears of being subjected to forced conversion and forced marriage if she returned to Iraq. In rejecting her appeal, the Migration Court “stated that it had taken into account the difficult situation for Mandeans in Iraq. However, the situation with numerous cases of forced marriage conversion or forced marriage had been connected to the general security situation in Iraq. During the two years that had passed since the applicant left, the situation had improved. What the applicant had submitted about being dislcaimed by her family did not constitute grounds for asylum.” In August 2010 the applicant was taken into custody awaiting enforcement of an expulsion order. The applicant claims under Article 3 that she would be subjected to ill-treatment through persecution, assault, rape, forced conversion and forced marriage if she were to return to Iraq.
M.E. v. France (no. 50094/10) – Communicated 21 February 2011. The applicant is an Egyptian national, a Coptic Christian. He claims that beginning in 2007 he and his family were targets of attacks because of their religious beliefs. He was struck on two occasions by persons of Muslim persuasion resulting on one occasion in hospitalization. Shortly thereafter he was arrested and placed into custody. He was released on bail, but when proceedings were opened against him he failed to appear and fled Egypt on 21 September 2007. In 2009 he was condemned in absentia to three years in prison for proselytism. He was arrested in France in August 2010 and placed in a detention center awaiting deportation. His appeal for asylum was rejected. The Court asks whether there is reason to believe that the applicant faces a real risk of treatment in violation of Article 3 if he is deported, because of his Coptic religion and particularly because of his religious activities and his prison sentence for proselytism. The Court further inquiries into the procedures of the applicant’s detention in France and the effectiveness of his remedies, in the sense of Article 13.
Catholic Sisters of Charity v. Turkey [La Compagnie des Filles de la Charité de Saint-Vincent-de-Paul c. Turquie] (no. 19579/07) – Communicated 4 February 2011. The applicant organization is a Roman Catholic congregation, the “Sisters of Charity,” whose seat is in Paris and who have been present in Turkey since the 19th century, during the time of the Ottoman Empire. For a century, the congregation has operated an orphanage near Istanbul. it has also administered a psychiatric hospital, a school run by lay people, the dispensary Saint-Benoît, and the lycée de Sainte-Pulchérie. The complaint concerns the property on which the orphanage was located in Bebek. In 1991 the Turkish General Directorate of Foundations rented part of the orphanage land to a commercial company, which in turn sold its long-term contract to a property company that instituted deportation proceedings against the applicant before the Tribunal de Grande Instance in Istanbul. In 1994, the Tribunal ordered the expulsion of the applicant from the property. The applicant was expelled in 1997. Following the promulgation in 2002 of a law allowing foundations to claim their properties, the applicant applied for the registration of the property in its name. The applicant was rejected on the grounds that the Congregation was not a foundation recognized by the state. Subsequent attempts to regain the property, through 2006, likewise failed. The applicant brings the case before the European Court of Human Rights alleging violations of Articles 1, 9, 13, and 14. In communicating the matter to the government of Turkey, the Court asks, inter alia, about the scope of the property rights the Congregation holds in the disputed domain. Has there been an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of the applicant’s property following cancellation of the title? If yes, was this interference in accordance with national law and the general principles of international law, and was it proportional to any aims pursued? Have the changes in Turkish law given the applicant an effective remedy? And, finally, has there been a breach of the applicant’s religious liberty in the inteference with the congregation’s mission to manage the orphanage?
Leontiuc v. Romania (no. 44302/10) – Communicated 3 February 2011. The applicant is a Romanian national incarcerated in the prison of Gherla on charges of conspiracy, fraud, forgery, and uttering forged documents as part of a trade initiated by the commercial company of which he was the director. Among the applicant’s complaints, mostly related to his prison term, is the assertion, citing violation of Article 9, that the reference of the prosecution to his Protestant religion placed him in an unfavorable light in the eyes of the public.
Dzhurayev v. Russia (no. 71386/10) – Communicated 2 February 2011. The applicant, Savriddin Dzhanobiddinovich Dzhurayev, is a Tajikistani national currently detained in Moscow. In Tajikistan he attended a mosque where he studied the Quran under the tutelage of Mr. S. Marufov, who was detained by the local police and allegedly severely ill-treated before he died in detention in 2006. Following Mr. Marufov’s death, Tajikistani law-enforcers began to target his followers. Mr. Dzhurayev fled to Russia. Several months later the Tajikistani prosecutor’s office iniated criminal proceedings against the applicant, accusing him of being an active member of “the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan” (IMU), characterized as an “armed criminal conspiracy.” As a result of an international search warrant issued in 2009, the applicant was apprehended by Russian police in Moscow and detained pending extradition. All appeals denied, the term of his detention has been extended until May 2011. The applicant complaints that his extradition would give rise to a treatment in violation of Article 3.
Church of Scientology of St. Petersburg and Others v. Russia (no. 47191/06) – Communicated 1 February 2011. The applicants, ten founding members of the “Church of the Scientology Mission of St Petersburg (organized in 1995), complain of violation of their rights under Articles 6, 9, 10, 11, and 14 of the Convention, in the refusal of Russian authorities to register their group as a legal entity, on the pretence that applicants had not complied with the provision of the Religions Act that required at least fifteen years’ existence in a given territory.
Animals Defenders International (ADI) v. United Kingdom (no. 48876/08) – Communicated 21 January 2011. The applicant (ADI) is a non-governmental organization based in the United Kingdom whose aims include the protection from and alleviation of suffering by animals. It campaigns against the use of animals in commerce, science, and leisure, seeking to achieve changes in law and public policy and to influence public and parliamentary opinion to that end. Given its campaigning objectives, ADI is not eligible for registration as a charity. In 2005 ADI began an ad campaign aimed to raise public awareness of exploitation of animals in zoos and circuses, a campaign that included a brief television advertisement. Though no objection was raised to the ad’s content or the intent of the advertisers, the Broadcast Advertising Clearance Centre (“the BACC”) declined to clear the ad because of a statutory prohibition of on political advertising on radio and television. Since the income generated from offering a product advertised for sale via the ad would be used wholly or mainly for political means, it would be unacceptable under the code, the BACC judged, and would set a dangerous precedent.
ADI applied for judicial review before the High Court, asserting violation of the ECHR Article 10 right to freedom of expression. It was accepted that the prohibition was “prescribed by law” and that it pursued the legitimate aim of the “protection of the rights of others.” The issue for the High Court was whether the prohibition was “necessary in a democratic society.”
In coming to their decision to dismiss ADI’s claim, the two judges of the High Court analyzed the ECtHR’s judgments in VgT Verien gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland and Murphy v. Ireland, rejecting reliance on the VgT case, which was decided on its particular facts (involving legislation that included a relaxation of controls on the timing and content of political and election broadcasts), and doubting the usefulness of Murphy, since it did not concern political advertising. Both judges emphasized the rationale for introducing the prohibition: “to preserve the integrity of the democratic process by ensuring that the broadcast media were not abused and distorted by wealthy interests in favour of a certain political agenda.” In 2008, the House of Lords unanimously dismissed the applicant’s appeal.
The complaint before the ECtHR arises under Article 10, asserting that as a result of the wide statutory prohibition on political advertising in the UK, the applicant has been unjustifiably denied the opportunity to advertise on television or radio. The Court raises the question as to whether there has been a violation of Article 10, and in particular whether the inteference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression was “necessary in a democratic society,” referencing the Vgt (no. 24699/94) and Murphy (no. 44179/98) cases, as well as TV Vest AS and Rogaland Pensjonistparti v. Norway (no. 21132/05).
Altınkaynak and Others v. Turkey (no. 12541/06) – Communicated 20 January 2011. Applicants are six Turkish nationals who attempted, in September 2004, to register a religious organization, Tükiye Yedincigün Adventisterli Vakfı (Foundation of the Seventh-day Adventists) in Istanbul. The tribunal of the first instance rejected their demand, judged that the objective of the organization was to meet the religious needs of people embracing the faith of Seventh-day Adventists and that this was contrary to provisions of the Turkish Civil Code prohibiting the establishment of foundations whose purpose is to support members of a particular community. The judgment was upheld in further court action. The applicants brought the case before the European Court of Human Rights relying on Articles 9, 11, 17 and 18 of the Convention to complain of violation of their freedom of association and freedom of religion, arguing that domestic courts have refused to register their foundation in the register kept by the Court of First Instance of Beyoğlu. Further invoking Article 14, they allege they were discriminated against because of their religious belief. In support of this claim, they argue that the application for registration of the Foundation of the Protestant Church of Istanbul, whose purpose and activities are similar to those listed in the statutes of their own foundation, was hosted by national courts.
Iorgoui v. Romania (no. 1831/02) – Communicated 10 December 2010. A Romanian citizen imprisoned for fraud complains, inter alia, of violation of his Article 9 religious freedom rights in the impossibility of practicing his Orthodox faith in prison. Having in an admissibility decision of 7 December 2010 found that the Article 9 issue was among those for which judgment should be deferred, the Court issued questions to the parties on 10 December, among the queries one asking whether the applicant could practice his religion in prison, and, if not, whether the interference was necessary as prescribed by law, in the sense provided by Article 9.
Brega and Others v. Moldova (no. 61485/08) – Communicated 23 November 2010. Moldovan nationals complain of interference with their celebration of a Western-style Christmas, including unjust detention and violation of their rights to freedom of expression and assembly. One applicant complains further (under Article 11) that the State did not discharge its positive obligations to protect his right to freedom of assembly.
D.N.W. v. Sweden (no. 29946/10) – Communicated 22 November 2010. This case involves a Coptic Christian from Ethiopia facing deportation and complaining under Article 3 that he would face persecution and mistreatment if he were sent back.
CICAD v. Switzerland (no. 17676/09) – Communicated 19 November 2010. The applicant organization, CICAD (“Coordination intercommunautaire contre l’antisémitimsme et la diffamation / Intercommunity coordination against anti-Semitism and defamation”), invokes Article 10 to complain of violation of freedom of expression in actions and judgments taken against them for public assertions of anti-Semitism against a professor at the University of Geneva.
Murtazaliyeva v. Russia (no. 36658/05) – Communicated 17 November 2010. The case involves a young Chechen woman who converted to Islam and became involved both in the extremist Islamic community and in Chechen terrorism. She complains of legal abuses involved in her arrest.
Güler v. Turkey (no. 1942/08) – Communicated 18 October 2010. Applicant İbrahim Güler, a Turkish national, was taken into police custody in 1996 during an operation carried out against Hizbullah, an illegal organization in Turkey. He admitted the affiliation but later claimed the admission was made under duress. He complains under Article 3 of ill-treatment during police custody and under Article 5 of lack of legitimate grounds for arrest and of excessive length of his detention. Relying on Article 6, he complains he was unable to benefit from assistance of a lawyer. He also makes complaints under Articles 8, 9, 10, and 12 and under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention.
Harroudj v. France (no. 43631/09) – Communicated 4 October 2010. Applicant Katya Harroudj is a French national who was awarded the legal right, under the Islamic doctrine of “kafala” in January 2004, to foster, though not to formally adopt, Zina Hind, an abandoned infant, a ward of the state in Algeria. The child, now called Hind Harroudj, has lived in France with the applicant and her mother since February 2004. In 2006 the applicant filed an adoption request in France, citing the best interests of the child under the international adoption provisions of the Hague Convention of 1989 as well as the child’s ECHR Article 8 rights to protection of family life. French courts, recognizing the prohibition in the Civil Code of adoption when the child’s country of origin forbids it, denied applicant’s request. The applicant appeals to the ECtHR, citing ECHR Articles 8 and 14. The Court asks if the impossibility of a French citizen to adopt an Algerian infant is compatible with articles 8 and 14, and in addition what weight should be attached to the fact that the legal relationship between the applicant and the child follows the “kafala” given to her by an Algerian court.